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We propose an information reconciliation protocol that uses two-way classical communication.
The key rates of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that use our new protocol are higher
than those of previously known protocols for a wide range of error rates for the BB84 and six-state
protocols. We also clarify the relation between the proposed and known QKD protocols, and the
relation between it and entanglement distillation protocols (EDPs).
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols provide a
way for two parties, a sender, Alice, and a receiver, Bob,
to share an unconditionally secure key in the presence
of an eavesdropper, Eve. Unlike conventional schemes
of key distribution that rely on unproven computational
assumptions, the security of QKD protocols is guaranteed
by the principles of quantum mechanics.
QKD protocols usually consist of two parts, a quantum
and a classical part. Alice sends a binary sequence to Bob
in the quantum part by encoding it into quantum states
that are randomly chosen from a set of non-orthogonal
states. Since unknown non-orthogonal states cannot be
cloned perfectly, any eavesdropping attempt by Eve will
disturb the transmitted quantum states. Thus, by esti-
mating the error rate of the transmitted quantum states,
Alice and Bob can estimate the amount of information
that Eve has gained. For the sequence that remains after
the error estimation phase, which is usually called the
raw key, Alice and Bob first carry out an information
reconciliation (IR) protocol [1] to share the same bit se-
quence. Alice and Bob then distill the final secure key
by conducting a privacy amplification (PA) protocol [2].
The best-known QKD protocols are the Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [3] and the six-state pro-
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tocol [4]. The unconditional security of the BB84 pro-
tocol has been proved [5, 6, 7]. Shor and Preskill [8]
presented a simple proof of the BB84 protocol by show-
ing that the QKD protocol that uses the entanglement
distillation protocol (EDP) [9, 10] can be converted into
the BB84 protocol. After that, the unconditional secu-
rity of the six-state protocol was proved [11] by using the
same technique as Shor and Preskill used [8]. Recently,
the security of generic QKD protocols that include the
BB84 protocol and the six-state protocol has been proved
[12, 13, 14], which are based on information theoretical
techniques instead of Shor and Preskill’s technique.
In addition to the security of QKD protocols, the key
rates of QKD protocols are also important, where the key
rate is defined by the ratio of the length of the final se-
cure key to the length of the raw key. Gottesman and Lo
[15] converted EDPs that use two-way classical commu-
nication into QKD protocols that use the same commu-
nication. More specifically, they proposed preprocessing
that uses two-way classical communication. By insert-
ing this two-way preprocessing before the conventional
one-way IR protocol, the key rates of QKD protocols are
increased when the error rate of a channel expressed as a
percentage is more than about 9 %. Indeed, the tolerable
error rate of the BB84 protocol is increased from 11 %
to 18.9 %, and that of the six-state protocol is increased
from 12.7 % to 26.4 %, where the tolerable error rate is
the error rate at which the key rate becomes zero. Chau
later showed that the two-way BB84 protocol can tol-
erate 20.0 % error rate, and that the two-way six-state
protocol can tolerate 27.6 % error rate [16]. Recently,
this kind of two-way preprocessing has been applied to
QKD protocols with weak coherent pulses [17, 18]. It
should be noted that this preprocessing is also known
within the classical key agreement context, in which it
is usually called an advantage distillation protocol [19].
Bae and Ac´ın and Ac´ın et al. [20, 21] extensively studied
2the noise tolerance of QKD protocols with advantage dis-
tillation protocols, on the other hand, we are interested
in the key rates of QKD protocols in this paper.
Vollbrecht and Vestraete proposed a new type of two-
way EDP [22]. This protocol uses previously shared EPR
pairs as an assistant resource (two-way breeding EDP),
and the distillation rate of this EDP exceeds that of one-
way EDPs for a whole range of fidelities, where a fidelity
is that between the initial mixed state and the EPR pair.
Using the fact that a breeding EDP can be converted into
a QKD protocol assisted by one-time pad encryption with
a pre-shared secret key [23], Vollbrecht and Vestraete’s
two-way breeding EDP [22] was converted into a two-
way QKD protocol assisted by one-time pad encryption
[17, 24]. The key rate of the converted QKD protocol is
higher than that of one-way QKD protocols [8, 11] for
a whole range of error rates. It should be noted that
the use of a pre-shared secret key is not the basis of their
improvement, because any QKD protocol that makes use
of a pre-shared key can be transformed into an equally
efficient protocol that does not need a pre-shared secret
key [25].
We propose an IR protocol that uses two-way classi-
cal communication in this paper. Our proposed protocol
is based on Vollbrecht and Vestraete’s idea of two-way
breeding EDP [22], but does not require any pre-shared
secret keys. Furthermore, our protocol does not leak
information that is redundantly leaked to Eve [17, 24].
More precisely, in these protocols [17, 24], Alice sends a
redundant message that is useless to Bob, but is useful
to Eve. However, in the proposed protocol, Alice does
not send that redundant information. As a result, for
the BB84 and six-state protocol, the key rates of the
QKD protocols that use our IR protocol are higher than
those of previously known protocols for a wide range of
error rates. Especially, the key rate of our protocol is
higher than those of known protocols [8, 11, 13, 24] for
the whole range of error rates. We also show the relation
between the proposed protocol and the advantage dis-
tillation protocol, i.e., the B-step of Gottesman and Lo
[15] (Remark 4). We also show the relation between the
proposed QKD protocol and Vollbrecht and Vestraete’s
EDP. As a results, it turns out that there does not seem
to be any EDP that corresponds to our proposed protocol
(Remark 5).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II proposes a two-way IR protocol. Section III presents
the key rate formula of the QKD protocol that uses our
proposed IR protocol. There is a proof of the key rate
formula in the Appendix D. Section IV presents the key
rate formula as a function of error rate. The proof of this
formula is presented in Appendix E.
II. TWO-WAY INFORMATION
RECONCILIATION PROTOCOL
We propose an IR protocol that uses two-way classical
communication (called two-way IR protocol after this) in
this section. When Alice and Bob have correlated classi-
cal sequences, x,y ∈ F2n2 , the purpose of IR protocols for
Alice and Bob is to share the same classical sequence by
exchanging messages over a public authenticated chan-
nel, where F2 is the field of order 2. Here, we assume
that the pair of sequences (x,y) is independently iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d) according to a joint probability
distribution, PXY , on F2 × F2.
Let us review some notations for a linear code to de-
scribe our IR protocol. An [n, n −m] linear code, Cn,m,
is an (n −m)-dimensional linear subspace of Fn2 . Then,
a parity check matrix, MCn,m , of code Cn,m is an m × n
matrix of rank m with 0, 1 entries such that cMTCn,m = 0
for any c ∈ Cn,m, where MTCn,m is the transpose ma-
trix of MCn,m . A decoder, gCn,m , of code Cn,m is a map
from a syndrome, t ∈ Fm2 , to an error, e ∈ D(t), where
D(t) := {e ∈ Fn2 | eMTCn,m = t} is the set of errors whose
syndromes are t. After this, we will assume that a lin-
ear code is implicitly specified with a parity check matrix
and a decoder.
We need to define some auxiliary random variables to
describe our IR protocol. Let ξ1 : F
2
2 → F2 be a func-
tion defined as ξ1(a1, a2) := a1 + a2 for a1, a2 ∈ F2, and
let ξ2 : F
2
2 → F2 be a function defined as ξ2(a, 0) := a
and ξ2(a, 1) := 0 for a ∈ F2. For a pair of joint
random variables ((X1, Y1), (X2, Y2)) with a distribu-
tion, P 2XY , define random variables U1 := ξ1(X1, X2),
V1 := ξ1(Y1, Y2) and W1 := U1+V1. Furthermore, define
random variables U2 := ξ2(X2,W1), V2 := ξ2(Y2,W1)
and W2 := U2 + V2. For the pair of sequences, x =
(x11, x12, . . . , xn1, xn2) and y = (y11, y12, . . . , yn1, yn2),
which is distributed according to the product distribu-
tion, P 2nXY , let u, v and w be 2n-bit sequences such that
ui1 := ξ1(xi1, xi2), vi1 := ξ1(yi1, yi2), wi1 := ui1 + vi1
and
ui2 := ξ2(xi2, wi1), vi2 := ξ2(yi2, wi1), wi2 := ui2 + vi2
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, the pair (u,v) is distributed
according to the distribution, PnU1U2V1V2 , and the dis-
crepancy, w, between u and v is distributed accord-
ing to the distribution, PnW1W2 . For sequence w, let
Tb := {j | 1 ≤ j ≤ n, wj1 = b} be the set of indices
of blocks such that the parities of the discrepancies are
b. For the subsequence, u2 := (u12, . . . , un2), let u2,Tb be
the subsequence that consists of the i-th bit of u2 such
that i ∈ Tb.
Well-known methods [15, 19, 22] of two-way process-
ing within the key distillation context have been to clas-
sify blocks of length 2 according to the parity, wi1, of
the discrepancies in each block. In conventional two-
way processing of the key distillation protocols [15, 19],
3which is so-called advantage distillation protocols, Al-
ice sends the parity sequence, u1 := (u11, . . . , un1),
to Bob so that he can identify the parity sequence,
w1 := (w11, . . . , wn1), of the discrepancies. Then, Al-
ice and Bob discard u1 and v1 := (v11, . . . , vn1) respec-
tively, because u1 is revealed to Eve. Furthermore, Al-
ice and Bob discard the second bit of the i-th block, if
the parity of the discrepancies is 1, i.e., i ∈ T1. Fi-
nally, Alice and Bob undertake an error correction pro-
cedure for the subsequences (u2,T0 ,v2,T0). More pre-
cisely, Alice sends the syndrome, t2 := u2,T0M
T
Cn0,m0 ,
for the prescribed [n0,m0]-linear code, and then Bob de-
codes wˆ2,T0 := gCn0,m0 (t2 + v2,T0M
T
Cn0,m0 ) and obtains
v2,T0 + wˆ2,T0 , where n0 := |T0| is the cardinality of the
set, T0.
Our two-way IR protocol, which is based on Vollbrecht
and Vestraete’s idea of two-way EDP [22], is quite similar
to the previously described two-way processing except for
one significant change. As is usual in information theory,
if we allow negligible error probability, Alice does not
need to send the parity sequence, u1, to Bob to identify
parity sequence w1. More precisely, Bob can decode w1
with negligible decoding error probability if Alice sends
a syndrome, t1 := u1M
T
Cn,m , for a linear code such that
the rate is mn ≃ H(PW1) [26, Corollary 2]. Since Eve’s
available information from syndrome t1 is much smaller
than that from sequence u1 itself, our IR protocol is more
efficient than the above-mentioned two-way processing in
most cases, which will be discussed in Section IV. Our
IR protocol is formally executed as follows, where the
tilde˜and hatˆon a sequence, a set or a number indicate
that they are guessed versions of those without these su-
perscripts. Note that the inputs of the IR protocol are
Alice’s bit sequence x and Bob’s bit sequence y, and the
outputs of the IR protocol are a sequence, uˆ, guessed by
Alice and a sequence, u˜, guessed by Bob.
(i) Alice locally computes u1 and Bob does the same
for v1.
(ii) For a prescribed [n, n−m] linear code, Cn,m, Alice
sends syndrome t1 = u1M
T
Cn,m to Bob.
(iii) Bob decodes wˆ1 := gCn,m(t1+v1M
T
Cn,m), and sends
wˆ1 to Alice.
(iv) Alice computes uˆ2. If the number, nˆ0 := |{i |
wˆi1 = 0}|, of blocks such that the guessed par-
ity, wˆi1, of the discrepancies is 0 does not satisfy
n0 ≤ nˆ0 ≤ n0 for prescribed integers, n0 and n0,
then Bob randomly guesses uˆ2,Tˆ0 . Otherwise, Al-
ice sends the syndrome, tˆ2 := uˆ2,Tˆ0MCnˆ0,mˆ0 , for a
prescribed [nˆ0, nˆ0 − mˆ0] linear code, Cnˆ0,mˆ0 .
(v) Bob decodes w˜2,Tˆ0 := gCnˆ0,mˆ0 (tˆ2 + vˆ2,Tˆ0M
T
Cnˆ0,mˆ0 ),
and obtains u˜2,Tˆ0 := vˆ2,Tˆ0 + w˜2,Tˆ0 .
Note that uˆ2,Tˆ1 and vˆ2,Tˆ1 are set to all 0s in our pro-
tocol, which is mathematically equivalent to discarding
them.
According to the universal channel coding theorem for
the linear code [26, Corollary 2], rates mn = H(PW1) + δ
and mˆ0nˆ0 = H(PW2|W1=0)+ δ for small δ > 0 are sufficient
for Bob to decode w1 and w2,T0 with negligible decoding
error probability. Furthermore, we set n0 := n(PW1(0)−
δ) and n0 := n(PW1 (1)+δ) to satisfy the condition, n0 ≤
nˆ0 ≤ n0, in Step (iv) with high probability.
Remark 1 Since we cannot estimate the probability dis-
tribution of error exactly in QKD protocols and the
actual distribution fluctuates around the estimated er-
ror distribution, universality of codes is required. Even
though the distribution of errors in the QKD protocols
are not necessarily i.i.d., it is sufficient to consider a uni-
versality condition on codes for the i.i.d. case. More
precisely, it is sufficient to use a linear code such that
the decoding error probability of the linear code is uni-
versally small for any binary symmetric channel whose
crossover probability is close to the estimated error rate.
Such observations were first pointed out by Hamada [27].
Efficiently decodeable linear codes such as the low den-
sity parity check matrix code [28] and the turbo code [29]
satisfy this condition.
III. SECURITY OF QKD AND KEY RATE
This section presents the asymptotic key rate of QKD
protocols that employs the IR protocol proposed in Sec-
tion II. The asymptotic key rate is derived by the security
proof method [12, 13, 14].
We implement a prepare and measure scheme in a prac-
tical QKD protocol. However, when we analyze the secu-
rity of a QKD protocol, it is usually more convenient to
consider its entanglement-based version. Without com-
promising security, we can assume that Alice and Bob’s
raw keys and bit sequences for error estimation are ob-
tained by measuring a bipartite state, ρANBN , on an N
pair of bipartite systems (HA ⊗ HB)⊗N , that ρANBN is
invariant under the permutation of the systems [42], and
that Eve can access TrANBN [ρANBNEN ] for a purification
ρANBNEN of ρANBN (see also [12, 13]). The specific form
of ρANBN depends on which scheme Alice and Bob em-
ploy to transmit a binary sequence, noise in the channel,
and Eve’s attack. From [14, Lemma 4.2.2], without loss
of generality, we can assume that purification ρANBNEN
lies on the symmetric subspace of (HA ⊗HB ⊗HE)⊗N ,
because any purification can be transformed into another
purification using Eve’s local operation.
Before the protocol is started, Alice and Bob discard
the last k subsystems, H⊗kA ⊗ H⊗kB , for technical rea-
sons of security proof. More specifically, k subsystems
are discarded to apply the de Finetti style representa-
tion theorem [14, Theorem 4.3.2] (see also [30]) in the
security proof. Therefore, we set N := 2n + m + k.
4Then, Alice and Bob conduct the protocol for the state,
ρA2n+mB2n+m := Trk[ρANBN ], where k is the number of
discarded systems,m is the number of systems for param-
eter estimation, and 2n is the number of systems that are
used for key distillation.
First, Alice and Bob undertake the following parameter
estimation protocol for the lastm-subsystems of the state
ρA2n+mB2n+m . The parameter estimation protocol is con-
ducted to estimate the number of discrepancies between
Alice and Bob’s raw keys, and the amount of information
that Eve has gained by eavesdropping.
(i) Alice and Bob carry out a bipartite positive opera-
tor valued measurement (POVM),M := {Ma}a∈A,
for each system, HA ⊗ HB, where A is the set of
measurement outcomes. The specific form of M
depends on which scheme we use.
(ii) If the type, Pa, of the measurement outcomes, a =
(a1, . . . , am), satisfies Pa ∈ Q for a prescribed set,
Q, the protocol outputs the type, Q := Pa, and
Alice and Bob conduct the key distillation protocol
according to Q, where the type of sequence a =
(a1, . . . , am) is the frequency distribution defined
by
Pa(a) :=
|{i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ai = a}|
m
for a ∈ A
(for more details on the type, see [31, Chapter 11]).
Otherwise, it outputs “abort”.
It is convenient to describe the parameter estimation
protocol using a completely positive (CP) map as fol-
lows. Let M⊗m := {Ma}a∈Am be a product POVM on
(HA⊗HB)⊗m, where Ma =Ma1 ⊗ · · ·⊗Mam . Then, we
can define a CP map, EQ, by
EQ : ρm 7→
∑
a∈T n
Q
(A)
TrMaρm, (1)
which maps the density operator to the probability such
that the parameter estimation protocol outputs Q, where
T mQ (A) is a set of all sequences on Am with type Q.
When the output of the parameter estimation protocol
is Q ∈ Q, Alice, Bob, and Eve’s tripartite state is given
by
ρQ
A2nB2nEN
:=
1
PPE(Q)
(idA2nB2n ⊗ EQ ⊗ idEN )(ρA2n+mB2n+mEN ),
where PPE(Q) is a probability such that the parameter es-
timation protocol outputs Q, and id denotes the identity
map on each system.
Alice and Bob apply a measurement MXY := {Mx ⊗
My}(x,y)∈F2×F2 on HA ⊗ HB to the remaining 2n sys-
tems to obtain classical data (raw keys). Then, Alice
and Bob’s measurement results, (x,y) ∈ F2n2 × F2n2 , and
Eve’s available information is described by a {ccq}-state
[43]
ρQ
XYEN
:= (E⊗2nXY ⊗ idEN )(ρQA2nB2nEN ),
where we introduce a CP map, EXY , that describes the
measurement procedure for convenience.
According to output Q of the parameter estimation
protocol, Alice and Bob decide the parameters of the
IR protocol: rate R(Q) := mn of linear code Cn,m, num-
bers n0(Q) and n0(Q) that are used in Step (iv), and
rate R0(Q) :=
m0
n0
of linear code Cn0,m0 for n0(Q) ≤
n0 ≤ n0(Q). Furthermore, Alice and Bob also decide the
length, ℓ(Q), of the finally distilled key according to Q.
According to the determined parameters, a final secure
key pair is distilled as follows.
(i) Alice and Bob undertake the two-way IR protocol
in Section II, and Alice obtains uˆ and Bob obtains
u˜.
(ii) Alice and Bob carry out a privacy amplification
(PA) protocol to distill a key pair (sA, sB) such
that Eve has little information about it. Alice
first randomly chooses a hash function, f : F2n2 →
{0, 1}ℓ(Q), from a family of two-universal hash func-
tions (refer [14, Definition 5.2.1] for a formal defi-
nition of a family of two-universal hash functions),
and sends the choice of f to Bob over the public
channel. Then, Alice’s distilled key is sA = f(uˆ)
and Bos’s distilled key is sB = f(u˜).
The distilled key pair and Eve’s available informa-
tion can be described by a {cccq}-state, ρQ
SASBCEN
,
where classical system C consists of random variables
(T1, Tˆ2,Wˆ1) that describe the exchanged messages
(t1, tˆ2, wˆ1) in the IR protocol and random variable F
that describes the choice of the hash function in the PA
protocol. To define the security of the distilled key pair
(SA, SB), we use the universally composable security def-
inition [32, 33], which is defined by the trace distance
between the actual key pair and the ideal key pair. We
cannot state security in QKD protocols in the sense that
the distilled key pair (SA, SB) is secure for a particular
output Q of the parameter estimation protocol, because
there is a slight possibility that the parameter estima-
tion protocol will not output “abort” even though Eve
has so much information. The QKD protocol is said to
be ε-secure (in the sense of the average over the outputs
of the parameter estimation protocol) if∑
Q∈Q
PPE(Q)
1
2
‖ρQ
SASBCEN
− ρQ,mixSASB ⊗ ρCEN‖ ≤ ε, (2)
where ρQ,mixSASB :=
∑
s∈SQ
1
|SQ| |s, s〉〈s, s| is the uniformly
distributed key on the key space SQ := {0, 1}ℓ(Q).
To state the relation between the security and the
asymptotic key rate of the previously mentioned QKD
protocol, define
Γ(Q) := {σAB | P σABA = Q}
5as the set of two-qubit density operators that are com-
patible with output Q of the parameter estimation pro-
tocol, where P σABA denotes the probability distribu-
tion of the outcomes when measuring σAB with POVM
M, i.e., P σABA (a) := Tr[MaσAB ]. For a purifica-
tion, σABE , of a density operator, σAB ∈ Γ(Q), let
σX1X2Y1Y2E1E2 := (E⊗2XY ⊗ id⊗2E )(σ⊗2ABE) be a {ccq}-state
that consists of 2-bit pairs ((X1, X2), (Y1, Y2)) and en-
vironment systems E1, E2. By using functions ξ1 and
ξ2, define random variables (U1, U2,W1,W2) for the pair
of bits ((X1, X2), (Y1, Y2)) in the same way as in Section
II. Then, let σU1U2W1E1E2 and σU1U2W1U1E1E2 be density
operators that respectively describe the classical random
variables (U1, U2,W1) and (U1, U2,W1, U1) with the en-
vironment system E1, E2.
Theorem 2 ForQ ∈ Q, i.e., the output of the parameter
estimation protocol such that the QKD protocol does not
abort, let ℓ(Q)2n be the key rate of the protocol. For any
ε > 0, if the key rate satisfies
ℓ(Q)
2n
<
1
2
min
σAB∈Γ(Q)
max
[
Hσ(U1U2|W1E1E2)
−H(PW1)− PW1(0)H(PW2|W1=0), (3)
Hσ(U2|W1U1E1E2)− PW1 (0)H(PW2|W1=0)
]
,
then there exists a protocol that is ε-secure in the sense
of Eq. (2) for sufficiently large n, where Hρ(A|B) :=
H(ρAB) − H(ρB) is conditional von Neumann entropy
[34], and H(P ) is Shannon entropy [31].
The meaning of the two arguments of the maximum
in Eq. (3) should be noted. The first argument states
that the key rate is given by the difference between Eve’s
ambiguity, Hσ(U1U2|W1E1E2), about Alice’s reconciled
key and the amount, H(PW1) + PW1(0)H(PW2|W1=0),
of information leaked in the IR protocol. On the
other hand, since information leaked from the syn-
drome, t1 = u1M
T
Cn,m , cannot be more than u1 it-
self, we can evaluate the key rate under the condi-
tion that Eve can access u1 itself, i.e., Eve’s ambiguity,
Hσ(U2|W1U1E1E2), about Alice’s reconcilied key and the
amount, PW1 (0)H(PW2|W1=0), of information leaked in
the IR protocol. If either of them is omitted, the key
rate is underestimated, which will be discussed in Sec-
tion IV.
Theorem 2 is formally proved by demonstrating the
above intuition formally, where we use a security proof
method [12, 13, 14]. More precisely, we use the tech-
niques of privacy amplification and minimum entropy,
and the de Finetti style representation theorem and the
property of symmetric states (see [14]). Since the tech-
niques used in the proof are not new and involved, we
give the proof for Theorem 2 in the Appendix.
IV. ANALYSIS OF KEY RATE
Here, we analyze the asymptotic key rate formula in
Theorem 2. More precisely, we derive a specific form of
the key rate formulas as functions of the error rates for
the six-state [4] and BB84 protocols [3].
Before analyzing the key rate, let us define some nota-
tions. For x, z ∈ F2, let
|ψ(x, z)〉 := 1√
2
(|0〉|0 + x〉+ (−1)z|1〉|1 + x〉)
be the Bell states on two-qubit systems HA⊗HB. For a
probability distribution, PXZ, on F2 × F2, a state of the
form, ∑
x,z∈F2
PXZ(x, z)|ψ(x, z)〉〈ψ(x, z)|,
is called a Bell diagonal state. We occasionally abbrevi-
ate PXZ(x, z) as pxz.
Theorem 3 For a Bell diagonal state, σAB =∑
x,z∈F2 PXZ(x, z)|ψ(x, z)〉〈ψ(x, z)|, we have
1
2
max[Hσ(U1U2|W1E1E2)
−H(PW1)− PW1(0)H(PW2|W1=0),
Hσ(U2|W1U1E1E2)− PW1 (0)H(PW2|W1=0)]
= max[1−H(PXZ)
+
PX¯(1)
2
h
(
p00p10 + p01p11
(p00 + p01)(p10 + p11)
)
,
PX¯(0)
2
(1−H(P ′XZ))], (4)
where h(p) := −p log p− (1 − p) log(1 − p) is the binary
entropy function,
PX¯(0) := (p00 + p01)
2 + (p10 + p11)
2,
PX¯(1) := 2(p00 + p01)(p10 + p11),
and
P ′XZ(0, 0) :=
p200 + p
2
01
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
,
P ′XZ(1, 0) :=
2p00p01
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
,
P ′XZ(0, 1) :=
p210 + p
2
11
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
,
P ′XZ(1, 1) :=
2p10p11
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
.
The theorem is proved by a straight forward calculation.
Thus, the proof is presented in the Appendix E.
The six-state protocol [4] uses three different bases de-
fined by z-basis {|0z〉, |1z〉}, x-basis {1/
√
2(|0z〉 ± |1z〉)},
and y-basis {1/√2(|0z〉 ± i|1z〉)}. When Alice and Bob
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Comparison of the key rates of the
six-state protocols. “Proposed” is the key rate of the six-
state protocol that uses the proposed IR protocol. “Vollbrecht
et al.” is the key rate of the two-way six-state protocol of
[17, 24]. “B-step” is the key rate of the two-way six-state
protocol of [15]. “One-way” is the key rate of the one-way
six-state protocol with the noisy preprocessing [13]. It should
be noted that the key rates of two-way six-state protocols
of [14, 15, 16] are slightly higher than that of the proposed
protocol for much higher error rate.
obtain an error rate, e, the set Γ(Q) consists of states
whose Bell diagonal entries p00, p10, p01, p11 satisfy con-
ditions p10 + p11 = e, p01 + p11 = e, and p01 + p10 =
e. Together with the normalization condition, we find
p00 = 1 − 3e2 and p10 = p01 = p11 = e2 . Since it is suffi-
cient only to minimize over the Bell diagonal states (see
the Appendix F), the key rate of the six-state protocol
for the error rate e is given by substituting p00 = 1− 3e2
and p10 = p01 = p11 =
e
2 into Eq. (4). The key rate of
the six-state protocol that uses the proposed IR protocol
is plotted in Fig. 1.
The BB84 protocol is similar to the six-state protocol,
but only uses the z-basis and the x-basis to transmit a
bit sequence. Thus, we only obtain two conditions on
the four coefficients p00, p10, p01, p11. Thus, the set Γ(Q)
consists of states whose Bell diagonal entries satisfy con-
ditions p10 + p11 = e and p01 + p11 = e. The resulting
candidates for Bell diagonal states in Γ(Q) have coeffi-
cients p00 = 1 − 2e + p11, p10 = p01 = e − p11, and
p11 ∈ [0, e], and we have to minimize the key rate for-
mula of Eq. (4) over the free parameter, p11 ∈ [0, e]. The
key rate of the BB84 protocol that uses the proposed IR
protocol is plotted in Fig. 2.
Remark 4 By using the chain rule of von Neumann en-
tropy, we can rewrite the l.h.s. of Eq. (4) as
1
2
{max[Hσ(U1|W1E1E2)−H(PW1), 0]
+Hσ(U2|W1U1E1E2)− PW1 (0)H(PW2|W1=0)}. (5)
We can interpret this formula as follows. If Bob’s ambi-
guity, H(PW1), about bit U1, i.e., the amount of trans-
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Comparison of the key rates of the
BB84 protocols. “Proposed” is the key rate of the BB84 pro-
tocol that uses the proposed IR protocol. “Vollbrecht et al.”
is the key rate of the two-way BB84 protocol of [17, 24]. “B-
step” is the key rate of the two-way BB84 protocol of [15].
“One-way” is the key rate of the one-way BB84 protocol with
the noisy preprocessing [13].
mitted syndrome per bit, is smaller than Eve’s ambiguity,
Hσ(U1|W1E1E2), about bit U1, then Eve cannot decode
sequence U1 [35, 36], and there exists some remaining
ambiguity about bit U1 for Eve. We can thus distill some
secure key from bit U1. On the other hand, if Bob’s am-
biguity, H(PW1 ), about bit U1, i.e., the amount of trans-
mitted syndrome per bit, is larger than Eve’s ambiguity,
Hσ(U1|W1E1E2), about U1, then Eve might be able to
decode sequence U1 from her side information, W1, E1,
E2, and the transmitted syndrome [35, 36]. Thus, there
exists the possibility that Eve can completely know bit
U1, and we can distill no secure key from bit U1, because
we have to consider the worst case in a cryptographic
scenario. Consequently, sending the hashed version (syn-
drome) of sequence U1 instead of U1 itself is not always
effective, and the slopes of the key rate curves in Figs. 1
and 2 change when Eve becomes able to decode U1.
The second and third terms of Eq. (5) are the same
as the key rate formula of the protocol that uses Gottes-
man and Lo’s B-step [15] followed by error correction
and privacy amplification. Even though Alice sends the
sequence U1 itself instead of its hashed version in the B-
step, the key rate of the protocol with the B-step is equal
to that of the proposed protocol for high error rates, be-
cause Eve can decode sequence U1 from her side infor-
mation and the transmitted syndrome.
Remark 5 The yield of Vollbrecht and Vestraete’s EDP
[22] and the key rate of the QKD protocols [17, 24] are
given by
1−H(PXZ)
+
PX¯(1)
4
{
h
(
p01
p00 + p01
)
+ h
(
p11
p10 + p11
)}
. (6)
7We can find by the concavity of the binary entropy func-
tion that the first argument in the maximum of the r.h.s.
of Eq. (4) is larger than the value in Eq. (6). To explain
why the key rate of the proposed protocol is higher than
that of [17, 24], we need to review the EDP [22] by using
the notations in Section II. Assume that Alice and Bob
share Bell diagonal states, σ⊗2nAB . First, Alice and Bob di-
vide 2n pairs into n blocks of length 2, and locally carry
out CNOT operation on each block, where the 2i-th pair
is the source and (2i− 1)-th pair is the target. Then, Al-
ice and Bob undertake the breeding protocol [9] to guess
bit flip errors in the (2i−1)-th pair for all i. The guessed
bit flip errors can be described by a sequence, wˆ1. Note
that two-way communication is used in this step. Ac-
cording to sequence wˆ1, Alice and Bob classify indices of
blocks into two sets, Tˆ0 and Tˆ1. For a collection of 2i-th
pairs such that i ∈ Tˆ0, Alice and Bob conduct the breed-
ing protocol to correct bit flip errors. For a collection
of 2i-th pairs such that i ∈ Tˆ1, Alice and Bob perform
measurements by {|0z〉, |1z〉} basis, and obtain measure-
ment results, x2,Tˆ1 and y2,Tˆ1 . Alice sends x2,Tˆ1 to Bob.
Alice and Bob correct the phase errors for the remaining
pairs by using information Tˆ0 and Tˆ1, and bit flip error
x2,Tˆ1 + y2,Tˆ1 .
If we convert this EDP into a QKD protocol, the differ-
ence between that QKD protocol and ours is as follows.
In the protocol converted from [22], after Step (iii), Alice
reveals the sequence, x2,Tˆ1 , which consists of the second
bit, xi2, of the i-th block such that the parity of dis-
crepancies wˆi1 is 1. However, Alice discards x2,Tˆ1 in the
proposed IR protocol of Section II. Since sequence x2,Tˆ1
has some correlation to sequence u1 from the view point
of Eve, Alice should not reveal x2,Tˆ1 to achieve a higher
key rate.
In the EDP context, on the other hand, since the bit
flip error, x2,Tˆ1+y2,Tˆ1 , has some correlation to the phase
flip errors in the (2i−1)-th pair with i ∈ Tˆ1, Alice should
send the measurement results, x2,Tˆ1 , to Bob. If Alice
discards measurement results x2,Tˆ1 without telling Bob
what the result is, then the yield of the resulting EDP
is worse than Eq. (6). Consequently, there seems to be
no correspondence between the EDP and our proposed
classical processing.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed an information reconciliation protocol
that uses two-way classical communication. For the
BB84 and six-state protocols, the key rates of QKD pro-
tocols that uses our information reconciliation protocol
are higher than previously known protocols for a wide
range of error rates. Furthermore, we showed the rela-
tion between the proposed protocol and the B-step of
[15] (Remark 4). We clarified why the key rate of our
protocol is higher than those of [17, 22, 24] (Remark 5),
and found that there does not seem to be any EDP that
corresponds to our proposed QKD protocol.
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APPENDIX A: NOTATIONS
These appendices are suplementary materials, in which
we prove Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and the fact that the
key rate formula evaluated for a Bell-diagonal state is
the worst case. The proof of Theorem 2 is based on the
proof method of [12, 13, 14], especially [14]. In Section
A, we review notations and fundamental results that are
used in subsequent sections. Notations in this paper is
almost the same as those in [14]. In Section B, we review
notions of the (smooth) min-entropy, the (smooth) max-
entropy, and the privacy amplification. Furthermore, we
additionally show some lemmas, which are used to prove
Theorem 2 in Section D. In Section C, we review the
property of symmetric states and the de Finetti style
representation theorem [14, 30]. We prove Theorem 2 in
Section D. Section E presents a proof of Theorem 3. We
show the fact that the key rate formula evaluated for a
Bell-diagonal state is the worst case in Section F.
1. Fundamentals
For a finite set X , let P(X ) be the set of non-negative
functions P on X , i.e., P (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X . If
P ∈ P(X ) is normalized, i.e., ∑x∈X P (x) = 1, then
P is a probability distribution on X . Unless stated as
a probability distribution, P ∈ P(X ) is not necessarily
normalized.
For a finite-dimensional Hilbert space H, let P(H) be
the set of non-negative operator ρ on H. If ρ ∈ P(H)
is normalized, i.e., Trρ = 1, then ρ is called a density
operator. Mathematically, a state of a quantum mechan-
ical system with d-degree of freedom is represented by a
density operator on H with dimH = d. Unless stated
as a density operator or a state, ρ ∈ P(H) is not neces-
sarily normalized. For Hilbert spaces HA and HB, the
set of non-negative operators P(HA⊗HB) on the tensor
product space HA ⊗HB is defined in a similar manner.
The classical random variables can be regarded as a
special case of the quantum states. For a random variable
X with a distribution PX ∈ P(X ), let
ρX :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x|,
8where {|x〉}x∈X is an orthonormal basis of HX . We call
ρX the operator representation of the classical distribu-
tion PX .
When a quantum system HA is prepared in a state ρxA
according to a realization x of a random variable X with
a probability distribution PX , it is convenient to denote
it by a density operator
ρXA :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxA ∈ P(HX ⊗HA), (A1)
where {|x〉}x∈X is an orthonormal basis of HX . We call
the density operator ρXA a {cq}-state [37], or we say
ρXA is classical on HX . We call ρxA a conditional opera-
tor. When a quantum system HA is prepared in a state
ρx,yA according to a joint random variable (X,Y ) with a
probability distribution PXY , a state ρXYA is defined in
a similar manner, and the state ρXY A is called a {ccq}-
state.
In quantum mechanics, the most general state evolu-
tion of a quantum mechanical system is described by a
completely positive (CP) map. It can be shown that any
CP map E can be written as
E(ρ) =
∑
a∈A
EaρE
∗
a (A2)
for a family of linear operators {Ea}a∈A from the ini-
tial system H to the destination system H′. We usu-
ally require the map to be trace preserving (TP), i.e.,∑
a∈AE
∗
aEa = idH, but if a state evolution involves a
measurement, then the corresponding CP map is not nec-
essarily trace preserving, i.e.,
∑
a∈AE
∗
aEa ≤ idH.
2. Distance and fidelity
In this paper, we use two kind of distances. One is the
variational distance of P(X ). For non-negative functions
P, P ′ ∈ P(X ), the variational distance between P and P ′
is defined by
‖P − P ′‖ :=
∑
x∈X
|P (x) − P ′(x)|.
The other distance used in this paper is the trace distance
of P(H). For nen-negative operators ρ, σ ∈ P(H), the
trace distance between ρ and σ is defined by
‖ρ− σ‖ := Tr|ρ− σ|,
where |A| := √A∗A for a operator on H, and A∗ is the
adjoint operator of A. The following lemma states that
the trace distance between (not necessarily normalized
operators) does not increase by applying a CP map, and
it is used several times in this paper.
Lemma 6 [14, Lemma A.2.1] Let ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(H) and let
E be a trace-non-increasing CP map, i.e., E satisfies
TrE(σ) ≤ Trσ for any σ ∈ P(H). Then we have
‖E(ρ)− E(ρ′)‖ ≤ ‖ρ− ρ′‖.
The following lemma states that, for a {cq}-state ρXB,
if two classical messages v and v¯ are computed from x
and they are equal with high probability, then the {ccq}
state ρXV B and ρXV¯ B that involve computed classical
messages v and v¯ are close with respect to the trace dis-
tance.
Lemma 7 Let
ρXB :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB
be a {cq}-state, and let V := f(X) for a function f and
V¯ := g(X) for a function g. Assume that
Pr{V 6= V } =
∑
x∈X
f(x)6=g(x)
PX(x) ≤ ε.
Then, for {ccq}-states
ρXV B :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |f(x)〉〈f(x)| ⊗ ρxB
and
ρXVB :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |g(x)〉〈g(x)| ⊗ ρxB,
we have
‖ρXVB − ρXVB‖ ≤ 2ε.
Proof. We have
‖ρXVB − ρXV B‖
=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)‖|x〉〈x|‖
· ‖|f(x)〉〈f(x)| − |g(x)〉〈g(x)|‖ · ‖ρxB‖
=
∑
x∈X
PX(x) · 2(1− δf(x),g(x))
≤ 2ε,
where δa,b = 1 if a = b and δa,b = 0 if a 6= b. 
The fidelity between two (not necessarily normalized)
operators ρ, σ ∈ P(H) is defined by
F (ρ, σ) := Tr
√√
ρσ
√
ρ.
The following lemma is an extension of Uhlmann’s theo-
rem to non-normalized operators ρ and σ.
Lemma 8 [14, Theorem A.1.2] Let ρ, σ ∈ P(H), and let
|ψ〉 ∈ HR ⊗H be a purification of ρ. Then
F (ρ, σ) = max
|φ〉〈φ|
F (|ψ〉〈ψ|, |φ〉〈φ|),
where the maximum is taken over all purifications |φ〉 ∈
HR ⊗H of σ.
9The trace distance and the fidelity have close relation-
ship. If the trace distance between two density operators
ρ and σ is close to 0, then the fidelity between ρ and σ
is close to 1, and vise versa.
Lemma 9 [14, Lemma A.2.4] Let ρ, σ ∈ P(H). Then,
we have
‖ρ− σ‖ ≤
√
(Trρ+Trσ)2 − 4F (ρ, σ)2.
Lemma 10 [14, Lemma A.2.6] Let ρ, σ ∈ P(H). Then,
we have
Trρ+Trσ − 2F (ρ, σ) ≤ ‖ρ− σ‖.
3. Entropy
For a random variable X on X with a probability dis-
tribution PX ∈ P(X ), the entropy of X is defined by
H(X) = H(PX) := −
∑
x∈X
PX(x) logPX(x),
where the base of log is 2. Especially for a real number
0 ≤ p ≤ 1, the binary entropy function is defined by
h(p) := −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p).
Similarly, for a joint random variables X and Y with a
joint probability distribution PXY ∈ P(X ×Y), the joint
entropy of X and Y is
H(XY ) = H(PXY )
:= −
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
PXY (x, y) logPXY (x, y).
The conditional entropy of X given Y is defined by
H(X |Y ) := H(XY )−H(Y ).
For a quantum state ρ ∈ P(H), the von Neumann en-
tropy of the system is defined by
H(ρ) := Trρ log ρ.
For a quantum state ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB) of the com-
posite system, the von Neumann entropy of the compos-
ite system is H(ρAB). The conditional von Neaumann
entropy of the system A given the system B is defined by
Hρ(A|B) := H(ρAB)−H(ρB),
where ρB = TrA[ρAB] is the partial trace of ρAB over the
system A.
Remark 11 In this paper, we denote ρA for TrB[ρAB]
or ρB for TrAC [ρABC ] e.t.c. without declaring them if
they are obvious from the context.
4. Method of type
In this section, we review the method of type that are
used in this paper (see [31, Chapter 11] for more detail).
For a sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn, the type of x is
the empirical probability distribution Px ∈ P(X ) defined
by
Px(a) :=
|{i | xi = a}|
n
for a ∈ X ,
where |A| is the cardinality of a set A. Let
Pn(X ) := {Px | x ∈ Xn}
be the set of all types on Xn. It is easy to confirm that
|Pn(X )| ≤ (n+ 1)(|X |−1).
For Q ∈ Pn(X ),
T nQ (X ) := {x ∈ Xn | Px = Q}
is the set of all sequences of type Q.
The probability that sequences in the set T nQ occur can
be expressed in terms of the divergence.
Lemma 12 [31, Theorem 11.1.4] For any probability
distribution P ∈ P(X ) and for any type Q ∈ Pn(X ),
we have
1
(n+ 1)(|X |−1)
exp{−nD(Q‖P )} ≤ Pn(T nQ )
≤ exp{−nD(Q‖P )},
where Pn(T nQ ) :=
∑
x∈T nQ P
n(x), the base of exp{} is 2,
and D(Q‖P ) is the divergence defined by
D(Q‖P ) :=
∑
x∈X
Q(x) log
Q(x)
P (x)
.
In the subsequent sections, we especially use the fol-
lowing inequality:
Qn(T nQ (X )) ≥
1
(n+ 1)(|X |−1)
(A3)
for any Q ∈ Pn(X ), which follows from the fact that
D(Q‖Q) = 0.
Lemma 13 [31, Lemma 11.6.1] For any probability dis-
tributions P, P ′ ∈ P(X ), we have
D(P‖P ′) ≥ 1
2 ln 2
‖P − P ′‖2.
The following corollary states that sequences whose types
are not close to P rarely occur as n increases.
Corollary 14 For any probability distribution P ∈
P(X ) and a set Bε(P ) := {x ∈ Xn | ‖Px − P‖ ≤ ε},
we have∑
x/∈Bε(P )
Pn(x) ≤ (n+ 1)(|X |−1) exp
{
− ε
2n
2 ln 2
}
.
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APPENDIX B: PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
In this section, we review the privacy amplification.
First, we review notions of the (smooth) min-entropy and
the (smooth) max-entropy. The (smooth) min-entropy
and the (smooth) max-entropy are useful tool to prove
the security of QKD protocol [12, 13, 14]. Especially,
(smooth) min-entropy is much more important, because
it is related to the length of the securely distillable key
by the privacy amplification. The privacy amplification
[2] is a technique to distill a secret key from partially
secret data, on which an adversary might have some in-
formation. Later, the privacy amplification was extended
to the case that an adversary have information encoded
into a state of a quantum system [14, 33, 38, 39]). Most
of the following results can be found in [14, Sections 3 and
5], but lemmas without citations are additionally proved
in this paper. We need Lemma 22 to apply the results in
[14] to our proposed two-way QKD protocol (QKD pro-
tocol with our proposed IR protocol). More specifically,
Eq. (3.22) in [14, Theorem 3.2.12] plays an important
role to show a statement similar as Corollary 23 in the
case of one-way QKD protocol (QKD protocol with one-
way IR protocol). However, the condition of Eq. (3.22)
in [14, Theorem 3.2.12] is too restricted, and cannot be
applied to our protocol. Thus, we showed Corollary 23
via Lemma 22. Lemmas 19 and 21 are needed to prove
Lemma 22. Lemmas 25–28 are implicitly used in [14]
without proof, which are also used in our proof in Sec-
tion D.
1. Min- and Max- Entropy
The (smooth) min-entropy and (smooth) max-entropy
are formally defined as follows.
Definition 15 [14, Definition 3.1.1] Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗
HB) and σB ∈ P(HB). The min-entropy of ρAB relative
to σB is defined by
Hmin(ρAB |σB) := − logλ,
where λ is the minimum real number such that λ · idA ⊗
σB −ρAB ≥ 0, where idA is the identity operator on HA.
When the condition supp(ρB) ⊂ supp(σB) does not hold,
there is no λ satisfying the condition λ · idA⊗σB−ρAB ≥
0, thus we define Hmin(ρAB|σB) := −∞.
The max-entropy of ρAB relative to σB is defined by
Hmax(ρAB|σB) := logTr
(
(idA ⊗ σB)ρ0AB
)
,
where ρ0AB denotes the projector onto the support of ρAB.
The min-entropy and the max-entropy of ρAB given
HB are defined by
Hmin(ρAB|B) := sup
σB
Hmin(ρAB|σB)
Hmax(ρAB|B) := sup
σB
Hmax(ρAB|σB),
where the supremum ranges over all σB ∈ P(HB) with
TrσB = 1.
When HB is the trivial space C, the min-entropy and
the max-entropy of ρA is
Hmin(ρA) = − logλmax(ρA)
Hmax(ρA) = log rank(ρA),
where λmax(·) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of the
argument.
Definition 16 [14, Definitions 3.2.1 and 3.2.2] Let
ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB), σB ∈ P(HB), and ε ≥ 0. The
ε-smooth min-entropy and the ε-smooth max-entropy of
ρAB relative to σB are defined by
Hεmin(ρAB |σB) := sup
ρAB
Hmin(ρAB|σB)
Hεmax(ρAB |σB) := inf
ρAB
Hmax(ρAB|σB),
where the supremum and infimum ranges over the set
Bε(ρAB) of all operators ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB) such that
‖ρAB − ρAB‖ ≤ (TrρAB)ε.
The conditional ε-smooth min-entropy and the ε-
smooth max-entropy of ρAB given HB are defined by
Hεmin(ρAB|B) := sup
σB
Hεmin(ρAB|σB)
Hεmax(ρAB|B) := sup
σB
Hεmax(ρAB |σB),
where the supremum ranges over all σB ∈ P(HB) with
TrσB = 1.
The following lemma is a kind of chain rule for the
smooth Min-entropy.
Lemma 17 [14, Theorem 3.2.12] For a tripartite opera-
tor ρABC ∈ P(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC), we have
Hεmin(ρABC |C) ≤ Hεmin(ρABC |BC) +Hmax(ρB). (B1)
The following lemma states that removing the classical
system only decreases the Min-entropy.
Lemma 18 [14, Lemma 3.1.9] (monotonicity of min-
entropy) Let ρXBC ∈ P(HX ⊗ HB ⊗ HC) be classical
on HX , and let σC ∈ P(HC). Then, we have
Hmin(ρXBC |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρBC |σC).
In order to extend Lemma 18 to the smooth min-entropy,
we need Lemmas 19 and 21.
Lemma 19 Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB) be a density oper-
ator. For ε ≥ 0, let ρˆB ∈ Bε(ρB). Then, there exists
a operator ρˆAB ∈ Bε¯(ρAB) such that TrA[ρˆAB] = ρˆB,
where ε¯ :=
√
8ε.
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Proof. Since ρˆB ∈ Bε(ρB), we have
‖ρˆB‖ ≥ ‖ρB‖ − ‖ρB − ρˆB‖ ≥ 1− ε.
Then, from Lemma 10, we have
F (ρB , ρˆB) ≥ 1
2
(TrρB +TrρˆB − ‖ρB − ρˆB‖)
≥ 1− ε.
Let |Ψ〉 ∈ HR⊗HA⊗HB be a purification of ρAB. Then,
from Theorem 8, there exists a purification |Φ〉 ∈ HR ⊗
HA ⊗HB of ρˆB such that
F (|Ψ〉, |Φ〉) = F (ρB, ρˆB) ≥ 1− ε.
By noting that F (|Ψ〉, |Φ〉)2 ≥ 1− 2ε, from Lemma 9, we
have
‖|Ψ〉〈Ψ| − |Φ〉〈Φ|‖ ≤
√
8ε.
Let ρˆAB := TrR[|Φ〉〈Φ|]. Then, since the trace distance
does not increase by the partial trace, we have
‖ρAB − ρˆAB‖ ≤
√
8ε.

Remark 20 In Lemma 19, if the density operator ρAB
is classical with respect to both systems HA ⊗HB, then
we can easily replace ε¯ by ε. Then, ε¯ in Lemma 21, 22
and Corollary 23 can also be replaced by ε.
Lemma 21 Let ρXB ∈ P(HX ⊗HB) be a density oper-
ator that is classical on HX . For ε ≥ 0, let ρˆB ∈ Bε(ρB).
Then, there exists a operator ρˆXB ∈ Bε¯(ρXB) such that
TrX [ρˆXB] = ρˆB and ρˆXB is classical on HX , where
ε¯ :=
√
8ε.
Proof. From Lemma 19, there exists a operator ρ′XB ∈
Bε¯(ρXB) such that TrX [ρ′XB ] = ρˆB. Let EX be a projec-
tion measurement CP map on HX , i.e.,
EX(ρ) :=
∑
x∈X
|x〉〈x|ρ|x〉〈x|,
where {|x〉}x∈X is an orthonormal basis of HX . Let
ρˆXB := (EX ⊗ idB)(ρ′XB). Then, since the trace distance
does not increase by the CP map, and (EX⊗idB)(ρXB) =
ρXB, we have
‖ρˆXB − ρXB‖
= ‖(EX ⊗ idB)(ρ′XB)− (EX ⊗ idB)(ρXB)‖
≤ ‖ρ′XB − ρXB‖
≤ ε¯.
Furthermore, we have TrX [ρˆXB] = TrX [ρ
′
XB] = ρˆB, and
ρˆXB is classical on HX . 
The following lemma states that the monotonicity of
the min-entropy (Lemma 18) can be extended to the
smooth min-entropy by adjusting the smoothness ε.
Lemma 22 Let ρXBC ∈ P(HX⊗HB⊗HC) be a density
operator that is classical on HX . Then, for any ε ≥ 0,
we have
H ε¯min(ρXBC |C) ≥ Hεmin(ρBC |C),
where ε¯ :=
√
8ε.
Proof. We will prove that
H ε¯min(ρXBC |σC) ≥ Hεmin(ρBC |σC)
holds for any σC ∈ P(HC) with TrσC = 1. From the
definition of the smooth min-entropy, for any ν > 0, there
exists ρˆBC ∈ Bε(ρBC) such that
Hmin(ρˆBC |σC) ≥ Hεmin(ρBC |σC)− ν. (B2)
From Lemma 21, there exists a operator ρˆXBC ∈
Bε¯(ρXBC) such that TrX [ρˆXBC ] = ρˆBC , and ρˆXBC is
classical on HX . Then, from Lemma 18, we have
Hmin(ρˆXBC |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρˆBC |σC). (B3)
Furthermore, from the definition of smooth min-entropy,
we have
H ε¯min(ρXBC |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρˆXBC |σC). (B4)
Since ν > 0 is arbitrary, combining Eqs. (B2)–(B4), we
have the assertion of the lemma. 
Combining Eq. (B1) of Lemma 17 and Lemma 22, we
have the following corollary, which states that the con-
dition decreases the smooth min-entropy by at most the
amount of the max-entropy of the condition, and plays
an important role to prove security of QKD protocols.
Corollary 23 Let ρXBC ∈ P(HX⊗HB⊗HC) be a den-
sity operator that is classical onHX . Then, for any ε ≥ 0,
we have
H ε¯min(ρXBC |XC) ≥ Hεmin(ρBC |C)−Hmax(ρX),
where ε¯ :=
√
8ε.
The following lemmas are also used in Section D.
Lemma 24 [14, Theorem 3.2.12] The following inequal-
ities hold:
• Strong sub-additivity:
Hεmin(ρABC |BC) ≤ Hεmin(ρAB|B) (B5)
for ρABC ∈ P(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC).
• Conditioning on classical information:
Hεmin(ρABZ |BZ) ≥ min
z∈Z
Hεmin(ρ
z
AB|B) (B6)
for ρABZ ∈ P(HA⊗HB⊗HZ) normalized and clas-
sical on HZ , and for conditional operators ρzAB ∈
P(HA ⊗HB) and ρzB ∈ P(HB).
12
In order to prove that removing the (not necessarily
classical) system increases the min-entropy at most the
max entropy of the removed system (Lemma 26), we need
the following lemma.
Lemma 25 Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB) be a density oper-
ator, and let rA := rank(ρA). Then, we have
rAidA ⊗ ρB − ρAB ≥ 0,
where idA is the identity operator on HA.
Proof. First, we prove the assertion for pure state ρAB =
|Ψ〉〈Ψ|. Let
|Ψ〉 =
rA∑
i=1
√
αi|φi〉 ⊗ |ψi〉 (B7)
be a Schmidt decomposition of |Ψ〉. Let {|φi〉}dAi=1 and
{|ψi〉}dBi=1 be orthonormal bases of HA and HB that are
extensions of vectors in Eq. (B7). For any vector |Φ〉 ∈
HA ⊗HB, we can write
|Φ〉 =
dB∑
i=1
βi|φˆi〉 ⊗ |ψi〉,
where {|φˆi〉}dBi=1 is normalized but not necessarily orthog-
onal. Then, we have
〈Φ|ρAB |Φ〉 = |〈Ψ||Φ〉|2 =
∣∣∣∣∣
rA∑
i=1
√
αiβi〈φi||φˆi〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
rA∑
i=1
√
αi|βi|
∣∣∣∣∣
2
and
〈Φ|(rAidA ⊗ ρB)|Φ〉 = rA‖
rA∑
i=1
√
αiβi|φˆi〉 ⊗ |ψi〉‖2
= rA
rA∑
i=1
αi|βi|2.
Using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality for two vectors
(1, . . . , 1) and (
√
α1|β1|, . . ., √αrA |βrA |), we have
〈Φ|ρAB|Φ〉 ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
rA∑
i=1
√
αi|βi|
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ rA
rA∑
i=1
αi|βi|2
= 〈Φ|(rAidA ⊗ ρB)|Φ〉.
Thus, the assertion holds for a pure state ρAB = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|.
For a mixed state ρAB, let ρAB =
∑m
i=1 pi|Ψi〉〈Ψi| be an
eigenvalue decomposition. Let ρiB = TrA|Ψi〉〈Ψi|. Not-
ing that rank(TrB|Ψi〉〈Ψi|) ≤ rank(TrBρAB) = rA for all
1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
rAidA ⊗ ρB − ρAB =
m∑
i=1
pi(rAidA ⊗ ρiB − |Ψi〉〈Ψi|) ≥ 0.

Lemma 26 Let ρABC ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC) and σC ∈
P(HC). Then
Hmin(ρABC |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρBC |σC)−Hmax(ρA).
Proof. Let λ is such that Hmin(ρBC |σC) = − logλ, i.e.,
λ is the minimum number satisfying
λidB ⊗ σC − ρBC ≥ 0.
Let rA := rank(ρA). Then, we want to show that
Hmin(ρABC |σC) ≥ − logλ− log rA = − log rAλ,
i.e., rAλidAB ⊗ σC − ρABC ≥ 0. From Lemma 25, we
have
rAλidAB ⊗ σC − ρABC
≥ rAλidAB ⊗ σC − rAidA ⊗ ρBC
= rAidA ⊗ (λidB ⊗ σC − ρBC) ≥ 0.

The following lemma states that Lemma 26 can be
extended to the smooth Min-entropy by adjusting the
smoothness ε.
Lemma 27 Let ε ≥ 0 and ρABC ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC)
be a density operator. Then, we have
H ε¯min(ρABC |C) ≥ Hεmin(ρBC |C)− log dimHA,
where ε¯ :=
√
8ε.
Proof. We will prove that
H ε¯min(ρABC |σC) ≥ Hεmin(ρBC |σC)− log dimHA
holds for any σC ∈ P(HC) with TrσC = 1. For any
ν > 0, there exists ρˆBC ∈ Bε(ρBC) such that
Hmin(ρˆBC |σC) ≥ Hεmin(ρBC |σC)− ν. (B8)
From Lemma 19, there exists a operator ρˆABC ∈
Bε¯(ρABC) such that TrA[ρˆABC ] = ρˆBC . Then from
Lemma 26, we have
Hmin(ρˆABC |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρˆBC |σC)− log dimHA. (B9)
Furthermore, from the definition of the smooth-min-
entropy, we have
H ε¯min(ρABC |σC) ≥ Hmin(ρˆABC |σC). (B10)
Since ν > 0 is arbitrary, combining Eqs. (B8)–(B10), we
have the assertion of the lemma. 
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Lemma 28 For density operators ρAB, ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗
HB) such that ‖ρAB − ρAB‖ ≤ ε′, we have
Hεmin(ρAB|B) ≤ Hε+ε
′
min (ρAB|B)
Proof. For all ρˆAB ∈ Bε(ρAB), by the triangle inequality,
we have
‖ρAB − ρˆAB‖ ≤ ‖ρAB − ρˆAB‖+ ‖ρAB − ρAB‖ ≤ ε+ ε′.
Thus, we have ρˆAB ∈ Bε+ε′(ρAB), and
Hεmin(ρAB |σB) ≤ Hε+ε
′
min (ρAB|σB)
for all σB ∈ P(HB). Then we have the assertion of the
lemma. 
2. Privacy amplification
The following definition is used to state the security of
the distilled key by the privacy amplification.
Definition 29 [14, Definition 5.2.1] Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗
HB). Then the trace distance from the uniform of ρAB
given B is defined by
d(ρAB |B) := ‖ρAB − ρmixA ⊗ ρB‖,
where ρmixA :=
1
dimHA idA is the fully mixed state on HA
and ρB := TrA[ρAB].
Definition 30 [40] Let F be a family of hash functions
from X to Z, and let PF be the uniform probability dis-
tribution on F . The family F is called two-universal if
Pr{f(x) = f(x′)} ≤ 1|Z| for any distinct x, x′ ∈ X .
Consider an operator ρXB ∈ P(HX⊗HB) that is clas-
sical with respect to an orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X of
HX , and assume that f is a function from X to Z. The
operator describing the classical function output together
with the quantum system HB is then given by
ρf(X)B :=
∑
z∈Z
|z〉〈z| ⊗ ρzB for ρzB :=
∑
x∈f−1(z)
ρxB,(B11)
where {|z〉}z∈Z is an orthonormal basis of HZ .
Assume now that the function f is randomly chosen
from a family F of function according to the uniform
probability distribution PF . Then the output f(x), the
state of the quantum system, and the choice of the func-
tion f is described by the operator
ρF (X)BF :=
∑
f∈F
PF (f)ρf(X)B ⊗ |f〉〈f | (B12)
on HZ ⊗ HB ⊗ HF , where HF is a Hilbert space with
orthonormal basis {|f〉}f∈F . The system HZ describes
the distilled key, and the system HB and HF describe
the information which an adversary Eve can access. The
following lemma states that the length of securely distil-
lable key is given by the conditional smooth min-entropy
Hεmin(ρXB|B).
Lemma 31 [14, Corollary 5.6.1] Let ρXB ∈ P(HX⊗HB)
be a density operator which is classical with respect to
an orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X of HX . Let F be a two-
universal family of hash functions from X to {0, 1}ℓ, and
let ε ≥ 0. Then we have
d(ρF (X)BF |BF ) ≤ 2ε+ 2−
1
2 (H
ε
min(ρXB |B)−ℓ)
for ρF (X)BF ∈ P(HZ ⊗HB ⊗HF ) defined by Eq. (B12).
APPENDIX C: SYMMETRIC STATES
In this section, we review the property of symmetric
states and the de Finetti style representation theorem
[14, 30]. For more detail, refer to [14, Section 4].
Let H be a Hilbert space and let Sn be the set of
permutations on {1, . . . , n}. For any π ∈ Sn, we denote
by the same letter π the unitary operation on H⊗n which
permutes the n subsystems, that is,
π(|θ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |θn〉) := |θπ−1(1)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |θπ−1(n)〉,
for any |θ1〉, . . . , |θn〉 ∈ H.
Definition 32 [14, Definition 4.1.1] The symmetric sub-
space Sym(H⊗n) of H⊗n is the subspace of H⊗n spanned
by all vectors which are invariant under permutations of
the subsystems, that is,
Sym(H⊗n) := {|Ψ〉 ∈ H⊗n | π|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉, ∀π ∈ Sn}.
Definition 33 [14, Definition 4.1.4] Let |θ〉 ∈ H be fixed,
and let 0 ≤ m ≤ n. We denote by V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) the set
of vectors |Ψ〉 ∈ H⊗n which, after some reordering of the
subsystems, are of the form |θ〉⊗m ⊗ |Ψ˜〉, that is,
V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m)
:= {π(|θ〉⊗m ⊗ |Ψ˜〉) | π ∈ Sn, |Ψ˜〉 ∈ H⊗n−m}.
The symmetric subspace Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) of H⊗n along
|θ〉⊗m is
Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) := Sym(H⊗n) ∩ span V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m).
If m ≪ n, then we can consider that a state |Ψ〉 ∈
Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗m) is almost the same as the product state
|θ〉⊗n.
The following lemma states that a permutation invari-
ant mixed states have a purification in the symmetric
space of a extended systems.
Lemma 34 [14, Lemma 4.2.2] Let ρn ∈ P(H⊗n) be
permutation-invariant. Then, there exists a purification
|Ψ〉 ∈ Sym((H⊗H)⊗n) of ρn.
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The following lemma states that a pure state on a sym-
metric space can be approximated by a convex combina-
tion of pure states that are close to a product state.
Lemma 35 [14, Theorem 4.3.2] Let ρn+k be a pure state
density operator on Sym(H⊗n+k) and let 0 ≤ r ≤ n.
Then, there exists a measure ν on S1(H) := {|θ〉 ∈
H | ‖|θ〉‖ = 1} and a pure density operator ρ¯|θ〉n on
Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) for each |θ〉 ∈ S1(H) such that∥∥∥∥∥Trk(ρn+k)−
∫
S1(H)
ρ¯|θ〉n ν(|θ〉)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 2e− k(r+1)2(n+k)+ 12 dim(H) ln k,
where the base of ln is e.
The following lemma states that the smooth min-
entropy of a density operator that is derived from a pure
state on Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−m) can be approximated from
below by the von Neumann entropy of a density operator
that is derived from a product state |θ〉⊗n.
Lemma 36 [14, Theorem 4.4.1] Let 0 ≤ r ≤ 12n, |θ〉 ∈H, and |Ψ〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) be normalized, and let
E be a trace-preserving CP map from H to HX ⊗ HB
that is classical on HX , i.e., E(ρ) is a {cq}-state for any
ρ ∈ P(H). Define ρXnBn := E⊗n(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) and σXB :=
E(|θ〉〈θ|). Then, for any ε > 0,
1
n
Hεmin(ρXnBn |Bn) ≥ H(σXB)−H(σB)− δ,
where δ = (52Hmax(σX) + 4)
√
2 log(4/ε)
n + h(r/n).
Lemma 37 [14, Theorem 4.5.2] Let 0 ≤ r ≤ 12n, |θ〉 ∈H, and |Ψ〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) be normalized. Let
M = {Mz}z∈Z be a POVM on H, and let PZ be a prob-
ability distribution of the outcomes of the measurement
M applied to |θ〉〈θ|. Then we have
Pr
z
[‖Pz − PZ‖ > α] ≤ ε
for
α := 2
√
log(1/ε)
n
+ h(r/n) +
|Z|
n
log(
n
2
+ 1)
where the probability is taken over the outcomes z =
(z1, . . . , zn) of the product measurement M⊗n applied
to |Ψ〉〈Ψ|.
Lemma 37 states that if the product measurementM⊗n
is applied to |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, then the probability such that type
Pz of the outcomes deviates from the distribution PZ is
small.
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. In Section D 1,
we first prove the security agaist known adversary. In
Section D2, we analyze the parameter estimation proto-
col. Then, using results in Sections D1 and D 2, we prove
Theorem 2.
1. Security against known adversary
In this section, we analyze a situation after the param-
eter estimation of the QKD protocols, i.e., we assume the
following situation. Alice and Bob have 2n-bit binary se-
quences (x,y) ∈ F2n2 × F2n2 that is distributed according
to a probability distribution PXY, and Eve can access
the quantum system HE whose state ρx,yE is correlated
to (x,y). This situation can be described by a {ccq}-
state
ρXYE :=
∑
(x,y)
PXY(x,y)|x,y〉〈x,y| ⊗ ρx,yE .
In the following, we follow the notations of Section 2
even though the distribution PXY is not necessarily the
product distribution P 2nXY .
In order to agree on a secure key pair (SA, SB), Alice
and Bob perform the procedure as in Section 3. Then,
the situation after the IR protocol and the privacy am-
plification can be described by a {ccq}-state
ρSASBCE :=∑
(sA,sB)
PSASB (sA, sB)|sA, sB〉〈sA, sB| ⊗ ρsA,sBCE ,
where the classical system C describes the exchanged
messages (T1, Tˆ2,Wˆ1) in the IR protocol and the choice
F of the hash function in the PA protocol. As in Section
3, the distilled key pair (SA, SB) is said to be ε-secure if
1
2
‖ρSASBE′ − ρmixSASB ⊗ ρE′‖ ≤ ε, (D1)
where ρmixSASB :=
∑
s∈S
1
|S| |s, s〉〈s, s| is the uniformly dis-
tributed key on S. The above security definition for the
key distillation protocol can be subdivided into two parts
(see also [14, Remark 6.1.3]):
• The distilled key pair (SA, SB) is εc-correct if∑
sA 6=sB
PSASB (sA, sB) ≤ εc.
• The distilled key SA is εs-secret if 12d(ρSAE′ |E′) ≤
εs.
In particular, if the distilled key (sA, sB) is εc-correct and
εs-secret, then it is (εc + εs)-secure.
The following theorem gives the relation between the
security and the length of distilled key.
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Theorem 38 Assume that Alice and Bob’s bit sequence
after the IR protocol are identical to u with probability
at least 1− ε1, i.e.,
PXY({(x,y) : uˆ = u˜ = u}) ≥ 1− ε1. (D2)
For a given number R,R0 > 0, assume that the rate
of linear codes that are used in the IR protocol satisfy
m
n ≤ R and m0n0 ≤ R0 for all n0 ≤ n0 ≤ n0. Further-
more assume that the length ℓ of the distilled key by the
privacy amplification satisfies
ℓ ≤ max[Hεmin(ρUW1E |W1E)− nR− n0R0,
Hεmin(ρUW1U1E |W1U1E)− n0R0]− log(1/8ε),(D3)
where ρUW1E and ρUW1U1E are derived from ρXYE by
using the functions ξ1 and ξ2 in the same way as in Sec-
tion 2. Then the distilled key pair (SA, SB) is (ε¯+ 3ε1)-
secure, where ε¯ := 32
√
8ε.
Proof. First, we will prove that the dummy key S :=
f(U) is ε¯-secret under the condition that Eve can access
(W1,T1,T2, F, E), i.e.,
1
2
‖ρSW1T1T2FE − ρmixS ⊗ ρW1T1T2FE‖ ≤ ε¯. (D4)
The assumption that Alice and Bob’s bit sequence are
identical to u with probability 1− ε1 implies that wˆ1 =
w1 and tˆ2 = t2 with probability 1 − ε1. Since (u, uˆ),
(w1, wˆ1), and (t2, tˆ2) can be computed from (x,y), by
using Lemma 7, we have
‖ρ
XYUˆWˆ1T1Tˆ2FE
− ρXYUW1T1T2FE‖ ≤ 2ε1.
Since the trace distance does not increase by CP maps,
we have
‖ρSAWˆ1T1Tˆ2FE − ρSW1T1T2FE‖ ≤ 2ε1.
Thus the statement that the dummy key S is ε¯-secret im-
plies that the actual key SA is (ε¯+2ε1)-secret as follows:
‖ρSAWˆ1T1Tˆ2FE − ρmixSA ⊗ ρWˆ1T1Tˆ2FE‖
≤ ‖ρSAWˆ1T1Tˆ2FE − ρSW1T1T2FE‖
+‖ρSW1T1T2FE − ρmixS ⊗ ρW1T1T2FE‖
+‖ρmixS ⊗ ρW1T1T2FE − ρmixSA ⊗ ρWˆ1T1Tˆ2FE‖,
where the first term is upper bounded by 2ε1, the sec-
ond term is upper bounded by ε¯, and the third term is
also upper bounded by 2ε1 because ρ
mix
S = ρ
mix
SA
. The
assumption of Eq. (D2) also implies that the distilled
key is ε1-correct. Thus the distilled key pair (SA, SB) is
(ε¯+ 3ε1)-secure.
In order to prove Eq. (D4), we use Lemma 31, which
gives the relation between the security and the length of
the distilled key. If the length ℓ of the distilled key by
the privacy amplification satisfies
log(1/8ε) + ℓ ≤ H
√
8ε
min (ρUW1T1T2E |W1T1T2E), (D5)
then the distilled key S is ε¯-secret. By using Corollary
23, we can lower bound the r.h.s. of Eq. (D5) by
Hεmin(ρUW1E |W1E)− nR− n0R0,
because the size of messages T1 and T2 are upper
bounded by nR and n0R0 respectively. Thus we have
shown the statement of the theorem for the first argu-
ment of the maximum in Eq. (D3).
Since the syndrome T1 is computed from the sequence
U1, if the distilled key S is ε¯-secret in the case that Eve
can access the sequence U1, then the distilled key S is ε¯-
secret in the case that Eve can only access the syndrome
T1 instead of the sequence U1. Again using Lemma 31,
if the length of the distilled key satisfies
log(1/8ε) + ℓ ≤ H
√
8ε
min (ρUW1U1T2E |W1U1T2E), (D6)
then the distilled key S is ε¯-secret. Again using Corollary
23, we can lower bound the r.h.s. of Eq. (D6) by
Hεmin(ρUW1U1E |W1U1E)− n0R0.
Thus we have shown the statement of the theorem for
the second argument of the maximum in Eq. (D3). 
2. Fluctuation of the actual error rate
In this section, we show that the parameter estima-
tion works with high probability (Lemma 39). Then, we
show that the information reconciliation protocol works
for symmetric errors if the protocol universally works for
the i.i.d. errors that are close to the estimated error dis-
tributions in the parameter estimation protocol (Lemma
40).
For the output Q ∈ Q of the parameter estimation
protocol, let
Γµ(Q) := {σAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB) | ‖P σABA −Q‖ ≤ µ}
be a set of two-qubit density operators that are com-
patible with the output Q with a fluctuation µ, where
P σABA denotes the probability distribution of the out-
comes when measuring σAB by the POVM M, i.e.,
P σABA (a) := Tr[MaσAB]. When ρm = σ
⊗m
AB is a product
state for σAB /∈ Γµ(Q), then by the law of large numbers,
the probability such that the parameter estimation proto-
col outputs the type Q is negligible. The following lemma
generalize this statement to permutation-invariant states.
Lemma 39 [14, Lemma 6.2.2] Let 0 ≤ r ≤ 12m.
Moreover, let |θ〉 ∈ HABE := HA ⊗ HB ⊗
HE , and let ρ|θ〉AmBmEm be a density operator on
Sym(H⊗mABE , |θ〉⊗m−r). For any εP > 0, if TrE |θ〉〈θ| /∈
Γµ(Q) for
µ = 2
√
log(1/εP)
m
+ h(r/m) +
|W|
m
log(
m
2
+ 1), (D7)
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then the probability such that the parameter estimation
protocol outputs Q is at most εP, i.e., EQ(ρ|θ〉AmBm) ≤ εP.
For the POVM MXY , which is used for obtaining the
raw keys in the QKD protocol, let P σABXY be the probabil-
ity distribution of the outcomes when measuring σAB by
the POVM MXY , i.e., P σABXY (x, y) := Tr[MxyσAB ]. For
µ¯ = 2
√
log(1/ε2)
2n
+ h(r/2n) +
log(n+ 1)
n
, (D8)
let
Qµ¯(Q) := {P ∈ P2n(F22) | min
σAB∈Γµ(Q)
‖P σABXY − P‖ ≤ µ¯}
be a subset of all types on F22. Note that if we measure
a product state σ⊗2nAB of σAB ∈ Γµ(Q) by the product
POVM M⊗2nXY , then the joint type Pxy of the outcomes
is contained in the set Qµ¯(Q) with high probability.
Lemma 40 Let ρ
|θ〉
A2nB2nE2n be a density operator on
Sym(H⊗2nABE , |θ〉⊗2n−r). Let P |θ〉XY ∈ P(F2n2 × F2n2 ) be a
probability distribution of the outcomes when measuring
ρ
|θ〉
A2nB2n by the POVM M⊗2nXY . Assume that Alice and
Bob’s bit sequence after the IR protocol are identical to
u with probability at least 1− ε1 for any probability dis-
tribution P ∈ Qµ¯(Q), i.e.,
P 2n({(x,y) : uˆ 6= u or u˜ 6= u}) ≤ ε1. (D9)
If TrE |θ〉〈θ| ∈ Γµ(Q), then we have
P
|θ〉
XY({(x,y) : uˆ 6= u or u˜ 6= u}) ≤ Lε1 + ε2, (D10)
where L := (2n+ 1)3, and ε2 is given in Eq. (D8).
Proof. For each type P ∈ P2n(F2 × F), let
γP :=
|{(x,y) : uˆ 6= u or u˜ 6= u} ∩ T 2nP |
|T 2nP |
be the ratio of pairs of sequences in T 2nP such that Alice or
Bob’s sequences after the IR protocol are not identical to
u. Since the distribution P
|θ〉
XY is permutation invariant,
we can rewrite the l.h.s. of Eq. (D10) as∑
P∈Qµ¯(Q)
γPP
|θ〉
XY(T 2nP ) +
∑
P /∈Qµ¯(Q)
γPP
|θ〉
XY(T 2nP ).(D11)
Since TrE |θ〉〈θ| ∈ Γµ(Q), by using Lemma 37, the second
term of Eq. (D11) is upper bounded by ε2.
On the other hand, by using Eq. (A3), we have
ε1 ≥ γPP 2n(T 2nP ) ≥
γP
(2n+ 1)3
for any P ∈ Qµ¯(Q). Thus, the first term of Eq. (D11) is
upper bounded by (2n+ 1)3ε1. 
3. Security poof
In order to save space, we abbreviate 2n + m by K.
In this section, if there are two operators ρ ∈ P(H) and
ρ˜ ∈ P(H), then the former represents the normalized
density operator of the latter, i.e., ρ = 1Trρ˜ ρ˜.
a. Parameter estimation
We first analyze the situation after the parameter esti-
mation protocol is executed. More specifically, by using
Lemmas 35 and 39, we will show Eq. (D13), which states
that the density operator ρQA2nB2nE2n after the parame-
ter estimation protocol can be approximated by a convex
combination of almost product states.
Since the tripartite state ρANBNEN lies on the sym-
metric subspace of H⊗NABE := (HA ⊗ HB ⊗ H)⊗N , by
using Lemma 35, the density operator ρAKBKEK is ap-
proximated by a convex combination of almost product
states, i.e.,
‖ρAKBKEK −
∫
S1
ρ
|θ〉
AKBKEK
ν(|θ〉)‖ ≤ κ,
where the integral runs over the set S1 := S1(HABE) of
normalized vectors on HABE , where
ρ
|θ〉
AKBKEK
∈ P(Sym(H⊗KABE , |θ〉⊗K−r))
for any |θ〉 ∈ S1, and where
r :=
2N
k
{ln(2/κ) + dim(HA ⊗HB) · ln k}.
Since the trace distance does not increase by applying a
CP map, we have
‖ρ˜QA2nB2nE2n −
∫
S1
ρ˜
Q,|θ〉
A2nB2nE2nν(|θ〉)‖ ≤ κ, (D12)
where
ρ˜
Q,|θ〉
A2nB2nE2n := (idA2nB2n ⊗ EQ ⊗ idE2n)(ρ
|θ〉
AKBKE2n).
Let
Vµ := {|θ〉 ∈ S1 | TrE |θ〉〈θ| ∈ Γµ}
be the subset of S1 that is compatible with the output Q
of the parameter estimation protocol with the fluctuation
µ. From Lemma 39, if |θ〉 /∈ Γµ(Q), then the probability
such that the parameter estimation protocol outputs Q
is at most εP, i.e., ‖ρ˜Q,|θ〉A2nB2nE2n‖ ≤ εP. Thus, we can
restrict the integral in Eq. (D12) to the set Vµ as
‖ρ˜QA2nB2nE2n − ρ˜
Q,Vµ
A2nB2nE2n‖
≤ ‖ρ˜QA2nB2nE2n −
∫
S1
ρ˜
Q,|θ〉
A2nB2nE2nν(|θ〉)‖
+‖
∫
Vcµ
ρ˜
Q,|θ〉
A2nB2nE2nν(|θ〉)‖ ≤ κ+ εP,
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where we set
ρ˜
Q,Vµ
A2nB2nE2n :=
∫
Vµ
ρ˜
Q,|θ〉
A2nB2nE2nν(|θ〉),
and Vcµ is the complement of Vµ in S1. By using the
following Lemma 41, the normalized version of the oper-
ators satisfy
‖ρQA2nB2nE2n − ρ
Q,Vµ
A2nB2nE2n‖ ≤ 2τ˜ , (D13)
where τ˜ := κ+εPPPE(Q) .
Lemma 41 Let ρ˜, σ˜ ∈ P(H) be (not necessarily normal-
ized) operators. Assume that ‖ρ˜− σ˜‖ ≤ ε for ε ≥ 0. Let
ρ := 1Trρ˜ ρ˜ and σ :=
1
Trσ˜σ be the normalized operators.
Then, we have ‖ρ− σ‖ ≤ 2ε˜ for ε˜ := εTrρ˜ .
Proof. From the assumption, we have ‖ρ−σˆ‖ ≤ ε˜, where
σˆ := 1Trρ˜σ. By using the triangle inequality, we have
1− ε˜ ≤ ‖ρ‖ − ‖ρ− σˆ‖ ≤ ‖σˆ‖ ≤ ‖ρ‖+ ‖σˆ − ρ‖ ≤ 1 + ε˜.
Thus, we have
‖σ − σˆ‖ = |1− ‖σˆ‖| ≤ ε˜.
Using once again the triangle inequality, we have
‖ρ− σ‖ ≤ ‖ρ− σˆ‖+ ‖σˆ − σ‖ ≤ 2ε˜.

b. Information reconciliation
According to Section 2, the IR protocol universally
works with a negligible error probability for i.i.d. er-
rors, if we set the parameters R(Q) = H(PW1) + δ,
R0(Q) = H(PW2|W1=0) + δ,
n0
n = PW1(0) + δ, and
n0
n = PW1(0)+δ. In this section, by using Lemma 40, we
show that the IR protocol also works with a negligible
error probability in the QKD protocol, i.e.,
PQXY({(x,y) : uˆ 6= u or u˜ 6= u}) ≤ ε1 + ε2 + 2τ˜ ,(D14)
where PQXY is the probability distribution of the out-
comes when measuring ρQA2nB2n by M⊗2nXY . Note that
ε1 is the error probability of the IR protocol for i.i.d. er-
rors, which exponentially goes to 0 as n → ∞ if we use
appropriate linear codes [26, Corollary 2]. As we will see
later, ε2 also exponentially goes to 0 as n→∞.
By using the fact that the trace distance does not in-
crease by the CP map (measurement byM⊗2nXY ), the l.h.s.
of Eq. (D14) is upper bounded by
P
Q,Vµ
XY ({(x,y) : uˆ 6= u or u˜ 6= u}) + 2τ˜ ,
where P
Q,Vµ
XY is the probability distribution of the out-
comes when measuring ρ
Q,Vµ
A2nB2n by M⊗2nXY . Since
ρ
Q,Vµ
A2nB2nE2n is a convex combination of density oper-
ators ρ
Q,|θ〉
A2nB2nE2n on Sym(H⊗2nABE , |θ〉⊗2n−r) such that
TrE [|θ〉〈θ|] ∈ Γµ(Q), by using Lemma 40, we have
Eq. (D14).
c. Privacy amplification
In this section, we analyze the PA protocol. By apply-
ing Theorem 38, if the length ℓ(Q) of the distilled key
satisfies
ℓ(Q) ≤
max[H ε˜min(ρ
Q
UW1EN
|W1EN )− nR(Q)− n0R0(Q),
H ε˜min(ρUW1U1EN |W1U1EN )− n0(Q)R0(Q)]
− log(1/8ε˜), (D15)
then the distilled key is (3
√
2ε˜+ 3ε1 + 3ε2 + 6τ˜)-secure,
where ρQ
UW1EN
and ρUW1U1EN are derived from ρ
Q
XYEN
by using functions ξ1 and ξ2 in the same way as in Sec-
tion 2. Let ε˜ :=
√
24τ˜ . Multiplying the probability
PPE(Q), the quantities PPE(Q)3
√
2ε˜ ≤ 6(6(κ + εP))1/4
and PPE(Q)6τ˜ = 6(κ+ εP) goes to 0 as κ, εP → 0. Thus,
the security of the distilled key, i.e., the l.h.s. of Eq. (2)
goes to 0 as κ, εP, ε1, ε2 → 0.
d. Evaluation of key rate
One more thing we have left is to replace the r.h.s. of
Eq. (D15) by smaller but more concise equation. Noting
that κ + εP ≤ ε˜, we can replace the last term log(1/8ε˜)
by log(1/8(κ+ εP)).
Let ρ
Q,|θ〉
XYE2n := (E⊗2nXY ⊗ idE2n)(ρ
Q,|θ〉
A2nB2nE2n), and let
ρ
Q,|θ〉
UW1E2n
be the density operator derived from ρ
Q,|θ〉
XYE2n
in the same way as in Section 2. Since ρ
Q,|θ〉
A2nB2nE2n lies
on Sym(H⊗nA2B2E2 , |θ2〉⊗n−r) for |θ2〉 := |θ〉⊗2, we can use
Lemma 36 to obtain
1
n
H
(κ+εP)
min (ρ
Q,|θ〉
UW1E2n
|W1E2n)
≥ Hσ(U1U2|W1E1E2)− δ′, (D16)
where
δ′ := 9
√
2 log(4/(κ+ εP))
n
+ h(r/n),
and where σU1U2W1E1E2 is derived from
σX1X2Y1Y2E1E2 := (E⊗2XY ⊗ id⊗2E )(|θ〉〈θ|⊗2) in the
same way as in Section 2.
Let ρ
Q,Vµ
UW1E2n
be a density operator derived from
ρ
Q,Vµ
XYE2n := (E⊗2XY ⊗ idE2n)(ρ
Q,Vµ
A2nB2nE2n) in the same way
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as in Section 2. Since ρ
Q,Vµ
UW1E2n
is a convex combination
of density operators ρ
Q,|θ〉
UW1E2n
, by using Eqs. (B5) and
(B6) in Lemma 24, we have
H
(κ+εP)
min (ρ
Q,Vµ
UW1E2n
|W1E2n)
≥ min
|θ〉∈Vµ
H
(κ+εP)
min (ρ
Q,|θ〉
UW1E2n
|W1E2n). (D17)
Since the trace distance does not increase by a CP
map, we have
‖ρQ
UW1E2n
− ρQ,Vµ
UW1E2n
‖ ≤ 2τ˜ . (D18)
By using (a) Lemmas 17 and 27, (b) Eq. (D18) and
Lemma 28, (c) κ+ εP ≤ τ˜ , (d) Eqs. (D16) and (D17), we
have
1
n
H
√
24τ˜
min (ρ
Q
UW1EN
|W1EN )
(a)
≥ 1
n
H3τ˜min(ρ
Q
UW1E2n
|W1E2n)− 2(m+ k)
n
log dimHE
(b)
≥ 1
n
H τ˜min(ρ
Q,Vµ
UW1E2n
|W1E2n)− 2(m+ k)
n
log dimHE
(c)
≥ 1
n
H
(κ+εP)
min (ρ
Q,Vµ
UW1E2n
|W1E2n)− 2(m+ k)
n
log dimHE
(d)
≥ min
|θ〉∈Vµ
Hσ(U1U2|W1E1E2)− δ′ − 2(m+ k)
n
log dimHE .
In a similar manner, we have
1
n
H
√
24τ˜
min (ρ
Q
UW1U1EN
|W1U1EN ) ≥ min|θ〉∈VµHσ(U2|W1U1E1E2)− δ
′ − 2(m+ k)
n
log dimHE .
Finally, setting k := α1n, m := α2n, κ := e
−α3k,
εP := 2
−α4m, ε2 := 2−α5n, and taking n → ∞ and
α1, α2, α3, α4, α5 → 0, we have the assertion of theorem.
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
This section presents a proof of Theorem 3 in the main
text.
Let
|ψABE〉 :=
∑
x,z∈F2
√
PXZ(x, z)|ψ(x, z)〉|x, z〉
=
∑
x,x∈F2
√
PX(x)|x, x+ x〉|φ(x, x)〉
be a purification of σAB =
∑
x,z∈F2 |ψ(x, z)〉〈ψ(x, z)|,
where we set
|φ(x, x)〉 := 1√
PX(x)
∑
z∈F2
(−1)xz
√
PXZ(x, z)|x, z〉,
and where PX(x) =
∑
z∈F2 PXZ(x, z) is a marginal distri-
bution. Then, let
σX1X2Y1Y2E1E2
:= (E⊗2XY ⊗ id⊗2E )(|ψABE〉〈ψABE |⊗2)
=
∑
~x,~x∈F22
1
4
P 2X(~x)|~x, ~x+~x〉〈~x, ~x+~x| ⊗ σ~x,~xE1E2 ,
where
σ~x,~xE1E2 := |φ(x1, x1)〉〈φ(x1, x1)| ⊗ |φ(x2, x2)〉〈φ(x2, x2)|
for ~x = (x1, x2) and ~x = (x1, x2).
Noting that
PX1X2Y1Y2(~x, ~x+~x) =
1
4
P 2X(~x),
we have
PU1(u1) =
1
2
PW1(w1) =
∑
~x∈F2
2
x1+x2=w1
P 2X(~x)
PU2|W1=0(u2) =
1
2
PU2|W1=1(u2) = 1
PW2|W1=0(w2) =
P 2X(w2, w2)
PW1(w1)
PW2|W1=1(0) = 1.
Using these formulas, we can write
σU1U2W1E1E2 =
∑
~u∈F22
∑
w1∈F2
PU1(u1)PW1 (w1)
PU2|W1=w1(u2)|~u, w1〉〈~u, w1| ⊗ σ¯~u,w1E1E2
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for ~u = (u1, u2), where
σ¯~u,w1E1E2 :=
∑
w2∈F2
PW2|W1=0(w2)σ
~uG,(w1,w2)G
E1E2
for w1 = 0 and a matrix G =
(
1 1
1 0
)
, and
σ¯~u,w1E1E2 :=
∑
a,b∈F2
1
4
σ
(u1,a)G,(w1,b)G
E1E2
for w1 = 1.
Since supports of rank 1 matrices {σ~x,~xE1E2}~x∈F22 are or-
thogonal to each other, σ~u,w1E1E2 for w1 = 0 is already eigen
value decomposed. Applying Lemma 42 for J = {00, 10}
and C = C⊥ = {00, 11}, we can eigen value decompose
σ~u,w1E1E2 for w1 = 1 as
σ~u,w1E1E2 =
∑
b∈F2
1
2
∑
~j∈J
P
J|~X=~x(~j)|ϑ((u1, 0), x,~j)〉〈ϑ((u1, 0), x,~j)|,
where we follow the notations in Lemma 42 for m = 2.
Thus, we have
H(σU1U2W1E1E2)
= H(PU1) +H(PW1) +
∑
w1∈F2
PW1(w1){H(PU2|W1=w1)
+
∑
~u∈F22
PU1(u1)PU2|W1=w1(u2)H(σ
~u,w1
E1E2
)}
= 1 +H(PX¯) + PX¯(0){1 +H(P~X|X¯=0)}
+ PX¯(1)H(P~XJ|X¯=1). (E1)
Taking the partial trace of σU1U2W1E1E2 over systems
U1, U2, we have
σW1E1E2 =
∑
w1∈F2
PW1(w1)|w1〉〈w1|
⊗

∑
~u∈F22
PU1PU2|W1=w1(u2)σ¯
~u,w1
E1E2

 .
Thus, we have
H(σW1E1E2) = H(PW1) +
∑
w1∈F2
PW1(w1)
H

∑
~u∈F22
PU1PU2|W1=w1(u2)σ¯
~u,w1
E1E2


= H(PX¯) +
∑
x¯∈F2
PX¯(0)H(P~X~Z|X¯=x¯). (E2)
Combining Eqs. (E1) and (E2), we have
Hσ(U1U2|W1E1E2)−H(PW1 )PW1(0)H(PW2|W1=0)
= 2−H(P~X~Z) + PX¯(1){H(P~XJ|X¯=1)− 1}
= 2− 2H(PXZ) + PX¯(1)h
(
p00p10 + p01p11
(p00 + p01)(p10 + p11)
)
.
On the other hand, by taking partial trace of
σU1U2W1E1E2 over the system U1, we have
σU1W1E1E2 =
∑
u1,w1∈F2
1
2
PW1 (w1)|u1, w1〉〈u1, w1|
⊗
( ∑
u2∈F2
PU2|W1=w1(u2)σ
(u1,u2),w1
E1E2
)
.
Thus, we have
H(σU1W1E1E2) = 1 +H(PW1) +
∑
u1,w1∈F2
1
2
PW1 (w1)
H
( ∑
u2∈F2
PU2|W1=w1(u2)σ
(u1,u2),w1
E1E2
)
= 1 +H(PX¯) +
∑
x¯∈F2
PX¯(x¯)H(P~XJ|X¯=1).
(E3)
Combining Eqs. (E1) and (E3), we have
Hσ(U2|W1U1E1E2)− PW1(0)H(PW2|W1=0)
= PX¯(0)(1−H(P ′XZ)).
Lemma 42 Let C be a linear subspace of Fm2 . Let
|ϕm(~x,~x)〉 1√
PmX (~x)
∑
~z∈Fm2
(−1)~x·~z
√
PmXZ(~x,~z)|~x,~z〉,
and σ~x,~xEm := |ϕm(~x,~x)〉〈ϕm(~x,~x)|. Let J be a set of coset
representatives of the cosets Fm2 /C, and
PJ|Xm=~x(~j) :=
∑
~c∈C⊥ P
m
XZ(~x,
~j+~c)
PmX (~x)
be conditional probability distributions on J. Then, for
any ~a ∈ Fm2 , we have
∑
~x∈C
1
|C|σ
~x+~a,~x
Em =
∑
~j∈J
PJ|Xm=~x(~j)|ϑ(~a,~x,~j)〉〈ϑ(~a,~x,~j)|,(E4)
where
|ϑ(~a,~x,~j)〉 := 1√∑
~e∈C⊥ P
m
XZ(~x,
~j+~e)∑
~c∈C⊥
(−1)~a·~c
√
PmXZ(~x,
~j+~c)|~x,~j+~c〉.
Remark 43 If ~j 6= ~i, obviously we have
〈ϑ(~a,~x,~j)|ϑ(~a,~x,~i)〉 = 0. Thus, the right hand side
of Eq. (E4) is an eigen value decomposition. Moreover,
if ~a+~b ∈ C, then we have |ϑ(~a,~x,~j)〉 = |ϑ(~b,~x,~j)〉.
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Proof. For any ~x ∈ C and ~a ∈ Fm2 , we can rewrite
|ϕ(~x + ~a,~x)〉 = 1√
PmX (~x)
∑
~j∈J
∑
~c∈C⊥
(−1)(~x+~a)·(~j+~c)
√
PmXZ(~x,
~j+~c)|~x,~j+~c〉
=
∑
~j∈J
(−1)(~x+~a)·~j
√
PJ|Xm=~x(~j)|ϑ(~a,~x,~j)〉.
Then, we have
∑
~x∈C
1
|C|σ
~x+~a,~x
Em
=
∑
~x∈C
1
|C|
∑
~i,~j∈J
(−1)(~x+~a)·(~i+~j)
√
PJ|Xm=~x(~i)PJ|Xm=~x(~j)
|ϑ(~a,~x,~i)〉〈ϑ(~a,~x,~j)|
=
∑
~i,~j∈J
(−1)~a·(~i+~j)
∑
~x∈C
1
|C| (−1)
~x·(~i+~j)
√
PJ|Xm=~x(~i)PJ|Xm=~x(~j)
|ϑ(~a,~x,~i)〉〈ϑ(~a,~x,~j)|
=
∑
~j∈J
PJ|Xm=~x(~j)|ϑ(~a,~x,~j)〉〈ϑ(~a,~x,~j)|,
where · is the standard inner product on the vector space
F
m
2 , and we used the following equality,∑
~x∈C
(−1)~x·(~i+~j) = 0
for~i 6=~j. 
APPENDIX F: BELL DIAGONAL STATE IS THE
WORST CASE
In this section, we show that the evaluation of
the key rate formula for a Bell diagonal state is the
worst case. Let σAB be a two-qubit density opera-
tor such that Bell diagonal entries are {PXZ(x, z)}, i.e.,
〈ψ(x, z)|σAB |ψ(x, z)〉 = PXZ(x, z). Let {XZ(x, z)}x,z∈F2
be the Pauli operators on the qubit, let σs,tAB :=
XZ(s, t)⊗2σABXZ(s, t)⊗2, and let
σˆAB :=
1
4
∑
s,t∈F2
σs,tAB
be the discrete-twirled operator of σAB . Note that σˆAB
is of the form
∑
x,z∈F2 PXZ(x, z)|ψ(x, z)〉〈ψ(x, z)| [41]. Let
σ~s,
~t
U1U2W1E1E2
be a density operator derived from a purifi-
cation σ~s,
~t
A2B2E2 of σ
~s,~t
A2B2 in the same way as σU1U2W1E1E2
is derived from a purification σ⊗2ABE of σ
⊗2
AB in Section
2, where σ~s,
~t
A2B2 := σ
s1,t1
AB ⊗ σs2,t2AB for ~s = (s1, s2) and
~t = (t1, t2). Since a phase flip error does not affect the
measurement by {|0z〉, |1z〉}-basis, and since a bit flip er-
ror only permutate the indices of measurement results,
we have
Hσ(U1U2|W1E1E2) = Hσ~s,~t(U1U2|W1E1E2).
Let
|ΦABESTS′T′〉 :=
∑
s,t∈F2
1
2
|Φs,tABE〉|s, t, s, t〉
be a purification of σ˜AB, where |Φs,tABE〉〈Φs,tABE | := σs,tABE .
Let σ˜U1U2W1E1E2~S~T~S′~T be a density operator derived from
Φ⊗2ABESTS′T′ in the same way as σU1U2W1E1E2 is derived
from σ⊗2ABE . Then, by using the strong subadditivity of
von Neumann entropy, we have
Hσ˜(U1U2|W1E1E2~S~T~S′ ~T′)
≤ Hσ˜(U1U2|W1E1E2~S~T)
=
∑
~s,~t∈F22
1
16
Hσ~s,~t(U1U2|W1E1E2)
= Hσ(U1U2|W1E1E2).
In the similar manner, we have
Hσ˜(U2|W1U1E1E2~S~T~S′ ~T′)
≤ Hσ(U2|W1U1E1E2).
On the other hand, PW1 and PW2|W1=0 are invariant un-
der the discrete twirling operation. Thus, Bell diagonal
state is the worst case for a fixed Bell diagonal entries
{PXZ(x, z)}.
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